Mayoral Devolution: When Responsibility Moves, Does Control Move With It?

Andy Burnham’s plan revives a tension already familiar in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and a governance question every board should ask: when responsibility is delegated, do authority, resources and accountability move with it?

Devolution is commonly described as the transfer of power away from Westminster and towards the nations and regions of the United Kingdom.

The word transfer suggests a relatively clean movement of authority from one institution to another.

In practice, responsibility for delivering an outcome may sit with a mayor, devolved government or local authority, while important decisions concerning funding, taxation, legislation, borrowing, national standards and intervention remain partly controlled elsewhere.

This produces a familiar exchange.

Westminster may reasonably say:

Local leaders were given the freedom to decide.

A devolved or regional leader may equally respond:

Our choices were constrained by the national funding settlement, statutory requirements or Treasury conditions.

Neither statement is necessarily false.

The governance question is whether either statement provides the public with a complete account of who possessed the authority to produce a different outcome.

What is being proposed for English mayors?

The government has announced that English mayors will receive a share of income-tax revenue for the first time and begin retaining a greater proportion of locally generated business-rate income.

Further details about the proportion of income tax and business rates involved are expected to be published in a fiscal-devolution roadmap at the Budget.

The government also intends to give local leaders greater control over housing, transport, planning, skills, employment support and elements of public-service delivery. Under a new “local first” principle, ministers will be expected to justify why powers should remain in Whitehall rather than being transferred to local leaders.

The official announcement also states that, where powers are devolved, Whitehall resources will follow (Prime Minister’s Office, 2026).

Taken together, these measures could represent a significant transfer of political, operational and financial authority.

However, the substance of the settlement will depend on the details that sit beneath the announcement.

It will depend on:

• how much revenue mayors are permitted to retain;

• how differences between regional tax bases are addressed;

• which decisions still require departmental or Treasury approval;

• which national rules continue to constrain local choices; and

• whether the resources transferred are sufficient for the responsibilities being assumed.

The existence of a new power does not, by itself, establish that those receiving it possess complete control over the outcome.

Is this an extension of the wider UK devolution tension?

Structurally, the answer is yes.

The tension emerging around English mayoral devolution resembles an argument that has played out for years between the UK Government and the devolved governments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

There are, however, important constitutional differences.

Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland possess both executive and legislative devolution. Their legislatures can pass primary legislation within areas of devolved competence.

English metro mayors possess executive powers but do not have legislatures capable of passing primary laws in the same way.

The UK’s system is therefore described as asymmetric devolution: different parts of the country possess different institutions, powers and relationships with Westminster (Torrance, 2024).

English mayoral devolution is not constitutionally equivalent to the settlements in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

But the underlying accountability problem can be similar.

One institution may be visibly responsible for services and outcomes, while another retains control over important elements of the financial, statutory or economic environment in which those services operate.

Scotland: significant autonomy within a shared fiscal system

The Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government possess substantial legislative, tax and spending powers.

Scotland can make different policy choices in areas including health, education, justice, transport and aspects of social security. It also has broader tax powers than the other devolved nations.

However, the Scottish Budget is funded through a combination of:

• a block grant from the UK Government;

• taxes raised in Scotland;

• adjustments reflecting devolved taxation and social-security responsibilities; and

• limited borrowing powers.

The Scottish Government therefore exercises meaningful discretion, but does so within a fiscal framework partly determined through agreements and decisions involving the UK Government (Scottish Government, 2026).

This makes it possible for two competing accounts to emerge.

Westminster may point to the choices made by Scottish ministers about taxation, spending and service design.

The Scottish Government may point to the size of the block grant, borrowing limits, reserved economic policies and UK-wide decisions affecting inflation, welfare, employment or public finances.

Both sets of decisions may have influenced the final outcome.

The difficulty for citizens is determining the relative weight of each.

Wales: devolved choices within negotiated limits

Wales also has a legislature, government, tax powers and responsibility for major public services.

The Senedd can legislate in devolved areas, while the Welsh Government controls services including health, education, housing, transport and local government.

Wales has powers over the Welsh rates of income tax and devolved taxes such as Land Transaction Tax and Landfill Disposals Tax. Its fiscal framework also covers block-grant adjustments, borrowing, budget-management tools and the financial effects of policy decisions made by either the UK or Welsh governments (Welsh Government and UK Government, 2026).

Again, this is genuine authority, but not complete fiscal sovereignty.

Welsh ministers can make different choices within their areas of responsibility. Yet the overall financial environment continues to be influenced by UK Government spending decisions, reserved taxation and the operation of the block-grant system.

The resulting political argument can therefore alternate between two positions:

The Welsh Government chose how to use the resources available.

And:

The range of available choices was shaped by decisions made at Westminster.

The challenge is not deciding which statement is universally correct.

It is identifying which institution controlled each material decision.

Northern Ireland: a distinct political and constitutional settlement

Northern Ireland’s system is different again.

The Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive exercise powers within a distinctive power-sharing structure. They are responsible for substantial areas of domestic policy, including health, education, agriculture, policing and justice.

However, other matters remain reserved or excepted to Westminster.

For example, the ability to set income-tax rates is reserved to the UK Parliament in Northern Ireland, while income-tax powers have been devolved to differing degrees in Scotland and Wales (House of Commons Library, 2025a).

Northern Ireland also receives substantial funding through the UK block-grant system.

Its accountability arrangements are further complicated by the requirements of power sharing, periods during which devolved institutions have not operated fully and the continuing role of the UK Government in maintaining the constitutional settlement.

The principle remains the same:

Responsibility for a public service can be devolved while some of the financial, legislative or constitutional conditions surrounding it remain outside the recipient institution’s control.

The role of block grants and the Barnett formula

The Scottish Government, Welsh Government and Northern Ireland Executive receive block-grant funding from the UK Government.

Changes in much of this funding are determined through the Barnett formula, which calculates changes to devolved-government funding by reference to changes in spending on comparable services in England.

Additional adjustments are then made to reflect factors such as devolved taxation, social-security responsibilities and particular funding arrangements.

HM Treasury publishes information explaining how the block grants are calculated and how UK spending decisions affect the devolved settlements (HM Treasury, 2025).

The system offers a degree of certainty and autonomy. Devolved governments can generally determine how block-grant funding is allocated across devolved priorities.

But it also creates an important distinction:

Control over allocation is not the same as control over the total resources available.

A government may decide how to divide its budget without controlling all the decisions that determine the size of that budget.

This is one reason political accountability becomes contested.

Westminster can point to devolved spending choices.

Devolved administrations can point to the funding envelope within which those choices were made.

Devolved does not mean sovereign

The constitutional position introduces another layer.

The UK Parliament remains sovereign and can legislate for all parts of the United Kingdom, including in areas that are normally devolved.

Under the Sewel Convention, Westminster will “not normally” legislate on devolved matters without the consent of the relevant devolved legislature.

However, the convention is not legally enforceable. The UK Parliament can ultimately proceed without consent (Torrance, 2025).

This creates a system in which devolved authority is both real and constitutionally limited.

The Scottish Parliament, Senedd and Northern Ireland Assembly possess democratic mandates and statutory powers.

At the same time, ultimate parliamentary sovereignty remains at Westminster.

Westminster can therefore emphasise devolved choice.

Devolved leaders can emphasise retained central authority.

Both can point to genuine features of the constitutional settlement.

The public may still struggle to identify which institution could realistically have chosen differently.

Could English mayoral devolution reproduce the same pattern?

The government’s English proposals are intended to move more power, funding and decision-making away from Whitehall.

Mayors would gain greater financial incentives to grow their regional economies, alongside broader authority over transport, housing, skills, employment and development.

The government has also stated that local areas will gradually move away from dependence on Whitehall grants and towards funding linked more directly to local economic growth (Prime Minister’s Office, 2026).

If authority, predictable resources and genuine discretion move together, the proposals could make local responsibility clearer.

But if mayors receive visible responsibility while significant financial, statutory or approval controls remain in Whitehall, England may reproduce a version of the tension already familiar elsewhere in the UK.

Westminster could say:

The mayor decided how to use the available resources.

The mayor could respond:

The available choices were determined by the national settlement.

A constituent council might add:

The strategic priority was set by the mayoral authority.

A delivery organisation could say:

We implemented the policy we were commissioned to deliver.

Every statement might be technically correct.

The overall system could still make it difficult to establish who owned the result.

The bureaucratic-shield risk

This does not prove that the policy is an attempt to contract out government responsibility or deliberately construct a bureaucratic shield.

The stated objective is to empower local leaders and improve public services by placing decisions closer to communities.

The risk arises from the design of the governance system rather than necessarily from the motives of those creating it.

A bureaucratic shield develops when responsibility is distributed across enough institutions, committees, funding arrangements and approval processes that each participant can provide a credible explanation for why another part of the system constrained the outcome.

The shield does not require anyone to lie.

It can be created through multiple incomplete truths.

A department may have approved the funding.

A mayor may have selected the priority.

A council may have controlled implementation.

A delivery body may have managed the service.

An auditor may have reviewed compliance.

A regulator may have set the relevant standards.

When the outcome disappoints, responsibility can move repeatedly around the system without settling in one identifiable place.

The National Audit Office has identified the tension

The National Audit Office has examined funding and accountability in English devolution.

It found that integrated settlements have the potential to support more creative, coordinated and longer-term decision-making.

However, it also identified a clear tension between the responsibilities of central-government departments and the ambition to replace Whitehall micromanagement with locally accountable autonomy.

The NAO concluded that this tension must be resolved and that local accountability arrangements must be substantially strengthened and tested before the devolution of funding and accountability can be considered fully effective (National Audit Office, 2026).

This illustrates the institutional problem.

Central-government accounting officers may remain answerable to Parliament for public money.

Mayors may be answerable to local voters for the choices made with that money.

Constituent councils may retain responsibility for services affected by mayoral strategies.

Delivery bodies may exercise operational control.

No single institution necessarily controls every part of the outcome.

Devolution can therefore create more local freedom while also creating more interfaces through which accountability must travel.

Shared responsibility is not necessarily a governance failure

Complex public outcomes rarely sit entirely within one organisation.

Transport affects housing, employment, planning and economic development.

Health outcomes are influenced by NHS services, social care, housing, welfare, education and employment.

Regional growth depends on local leadership, national economic policy, infrastructure, private investment, workforce capability and wider market conditions.

Some degree of shared responsibility is unavoidable.

The issue is not whether several organisations contribute to an outcome.

The issue is whether their respective responsibilities are clear before decisions are taken and traceable after the consequences become visible.

Shared delivery can be effective.

Ambiguous accountability is different.

The hidden message for boards

The same problem regularly appears inside organisations.

Boards devolve responsibility through:

• business units;

• regional operating models;

• transformation programmes;

• subsidiary boards;

• strategic partnerships;

• outsourcing arrangements;

• delegated investment authorities;

• shared-service functions; and

• product or service teams.

A business-unit leader may be held accountable for financial performance while central functions control recruitment, technology, procurement or pricing.

A transformation director may own delivery while operational executives retain authority over the people and processes that must change.

A supplier may be contracted to provide a service, while the organisation retains the customer, regulatory and reputational consequences.

A committee may be asked to oversee risk without possessing the information or authority needed to change the underlying decision.

A product team may be accountable for an outcome while being dependent on several other functions whose priorities it cannot control.

In each case, the organisation can claim to have delegated responsibility.

The person receiving it may still lack the practical agency needed to deliver.

This creates the organisational equivalent of the constitutional exchange.

The board may say:

The executive had responsibility for the outcome.

The executive may respond:

The critical resources and decisions remained under central control.

The central function may say:

We applied the organisation’s agreed policies and standards.

The supplier or delivery team may add:

We worked within the scope, funding and constraints we were given.

Again, every statement may contain truth.

The cumulative effect may still be a system in which accountability is dispersed.

Delegation is a system, not an instruction

Assigning responsibility does not automatically create empowerment.

Meaningful delegation generally requires several elements to move together.

Authority

Can the recipient make the decisions that materially affect the outcome?

Resources

Do they control, or have dependable access to, the money, people, information and technology required?

Capability

Do they possess the experience, institutional knowledge and support needed to exercise that authority well?

Boundaries

Is it clear which decisions have been delegated and which remain reserved to the board, parent organisation or central function?

Scrutiny

Can assumptions and decisions be challenged before consequences become difficult to reverse?

Intervention rights

Is it clear when the delegating authority can step back in, and what that means for the recipient’s autonomy?

Accountability

Can stakeholders identify who owned the decision, rather than simply who became the public face of the result?

When these elements are separated, responsibility may have been assigned without control having been transferred.

Questions the devolution debate places before boards

The developing English settlement offers a useful set of questions for public institutions and corporate boards alike:

What decisions can the recipient make without further approval?

Which resources move with the responsibility?

Which important levers remain controlled elsewhere?

What policies, standards or statutory duties constrain discretion?

Who carries the consequences if the available resources prove insufficient?

Can the delegating authority intervene after responsibility has been transferred?

If it can, how autonomous is the recipient in practice?

Who will stakeholders hold responsible when the outcome disappoints?

Did that person or institution possess the authority to choose differently?

Can the complete decision path be reconstructed afterwards?

These questions do not establish whether devolution, or organisational delegation, is inherently desirable.

They help reveal what has actually been transferred.

The final test is not where responsibility sits

The debate surrounding English mayors is an extension of the longer-running tensions between Westminster and the governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

It reflects the same underlying governance challenge:

Responsibility can be devolved more easily than the complete system of control surrounding it.

That does not prove that the current proposals are designed to move blame.

Nor does it suggest that devolved or regional leaders lack meaningful choices.

It does mean that the success of the arrangement cannot be judged solely by the powers listed in an announcement, statute or organisational chart.

The more revealing test is whether the answers to the following questions point towards the same institution:

Who had the authority?

Who controlled the resources?

Who set the constraints?

Who made the decision?

Who could intervene?

Who was accountable for the result?

When those answers align, devolution can make democratic responsibility clearer.

When they point in several directions, local freedom and central constraint may coexist, and accountability may become a matter of competing interpretations rather than an identifiable line of ownership.

References

HM Treasury (2025) Block Grant Transparency: October 2025. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/block-grant-transparency-october-2025 (Accessed: 31 July 2026).

House of Commons Library (2025a) Reserved Matters in the United Kingdom. Available at: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8544/ (Accessed: 31 July 2026).

National Audit Office (2026) Devolution in England: Funding and Accountability. HC 263, Session 2026–27. Available at: https://www.nao.org.uk/reports/devolution-in-england-funding-and-accountability/ (Accessed: 31 July 2026).

Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street (2026) ‘PM hands mayors share of income tax to make lives better in every postcode’, 30 July. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/pm-hands-mayors-share-of-income-tax-to-make-lives-better-in-every-postcode (Accessed: 31 July 2026).

Scottish Government (2026) Scottish Budget 2026 to 2027: Your Scotland, Your Finances—A Guide. Available at: https://www.gov.scot/publications/scottish-budget-guide/pages/scottish-budget-2026-to-2027-guide/ (Accessed: 31 July 2026).

Torrance, D. (2024) Introduction to Devolution in the United Kingdom. House of Commons Library Research Briefing CBP-8599, 21 May. Available at: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8599/ (Accessed: 31 July 2026).

Torrance, D. (2025) The Sewel Convention and Legislative Consent. House of Commons Library Research Briefing CBP-8883, 4 August. Available at: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8883/ (Accessed: 31 July 2026).

Welsh Government and UK Government (2026) The Agreement Between the Welsh Government and the United Kingdom Government on the Welsh Government’s Fiscal Framework. Available at: https://www.gov.wales/sites/default/files/publications/2026-05/agreement-on-welsh-government-fiscal-framework.pdf (Accessed: 31 July 2026).